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FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916
(9th Cir. 2019)
Seth T. Bonilla
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, FMC Corporation (“FMC”) agreed to submit to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ (“Tribes”) permitting processes, including the
payment of fees, for clean-up work required as part of consent decree negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).1 Then, in
2002, FMC refused to pay the Tribes under a permitting agreement entered
into by both parties, even though the company continued to store hazardous waste on land within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation in
Idaho (“Reservation”).2 FMC challenged the Tribes’ authority to enforce
the $1.5 million permitting fees first in tribal court and later challenged the
Tribes’ authority to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction
over the non-Indian corporation in federal court.3 FMC Corp. v. ShoshoneBannock Tribes demonstrates the complexities and fraught nature of tribal
civil jurisdiction.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
FMC opened an elemental phosphorus plant on fee land within the
Reservation in 1949.4 This plant produced twenty-two million tons of hazardous waste, including arsenic and “radioactive materials that emit
gamma radiation,” which FMC stored on the Reservation.5 After declaring
FMC’s plant a Superfund site under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation, and Liabilities Act (“CERCLA”), 6 the EPA
charged FMC with violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”)7.8 To avoid litigation, FMC negotiated the terms of a consent
decree with the EPA.9 The consent decree included a provision requiring
FMC to apply for all necessary clean-up permits from the Tribes.10

1.
FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
161387, at *8 (D. Idaho 2017) [hereinafter FMC Corp. I].
2.
FMC Corp. v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir.
2019) [hereinafter FMC Corp II].
3.
FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3.
4.
Id. at *5.
5.
Id.
6.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018).
7.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k.
8.
FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5.
9.
Id. at *5–6.
10.
Id. at *6.
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Faced with high permitting fees, FMC negotiated an agreement
with the Tribes where the company agreed to tribal jurisdiction in exchange for reduced fees. 11 Under this accord, FMC agreed to pay the
Tribes $2.5 million on June 1, 1998, and $1.5 million annually to continue
storing the waste on the Reservation.12 Within months of resolving the permitting issue, FMC and the EPA completed negotiations and established
the consent decree.13 Under the terms of the consent decree, the EPA required FMC to pay $11.9 million in fines, cap the plant’s waste ponds, and
comply with tribal permitting.14 The consent decree further required FMC
to pay a $1.5 million annual fee as part of its compliance with tribal permitting.15
FMC paid $2.5 million on June 1, 1998,16 and paid “the annual
use permit fee from 1998 to 2001, but refused to pay the fee in 2002 after
ceasing active plant operations.”17 Despite closing its plant and refusing to
pay the annual fee, FMC continued to store hazardous waste on the Reservation.18
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
FMC challenged the annual fee in tribal court, producing evidence
showing the stored waste caused no harm and claiming “the EPA’s containment program foreclosed any need to impose substantial fees.”19 Conversely, the Tribes produced evidence that the stored waste “was severely
toxic, would remain so for generations, and could not be moved off-site.”20
The tribal court issued two opinions.21 The first opinion established the
Tribes had jurisdiction, while the second established the tribal permits
FMC obtained under the 1998 agreement with the Tribes had not been
codified in a tribal ordinance, and the Secretary of the Interior had not
approved the $1.5 million annual fee.22
The Tribes appealed to the tribal appellate court, which ruled in
favor of the Tribes, finding they had satisfied the first Montana v. United
States exception and ordered FMC to pay the $1.5 million annual fee.23

11.
FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7.
12.
Id. at *8.
13.
Id. at *9.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at *3.
16.
Id.
17.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 919.
18.
Id.
19.
FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *3.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at *13.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at *13, *16 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–
66 (1981) (stating a tribe may establish civil jurisdiction over non-Indians if either the
non-Indian consents to tribal jurisdiction or the non-Indian’s conduct threatens the
“political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”)).
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Three months prior to reaching the decision, but while still deliberating the issue, two of the judges from the three-judge tribal appellate
panel attended a conference at the University of Idaho School of Law.24
At the conference, the judges criticized many United States Supreme Court
decisions in federal Indian law and discussed the need to protect tribal
sovereignty.25 The judges were particularly critical of the Court’s decision
in Montana v. United States.26
Nearly a year later, the two judges were removed and replaced for
unrelated reasons, and FMC filed a motion for the tribal appellate court to
reconsider its decision.27 The court granted the request for reconsideration
but affirmed the initial decision. 28 Subsequently, FMC challenged the
tribal court’s jurisdiction in federal district court and claimed the tribal
appellate court’s bias had violated FMC’s due process rights.29
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho (“District
Court”) held that the Tribes had jurisdiction under both exceptions to the
general presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians established in Montana.30 The District Court found that FMC consented to
the Tribes’ jurisdiction,31 and “the record show[ed] conclusively that a
failure by the EPA to contain the massive amount of highly toxic FMC
waste would be catastrophic for the health and welfare of the Tribes.”32
Further, the District Court found “FMC received a full and fair trial before
an impartial tribal appellate court, and c[ould] find no prejudice there or
in the Tribes’ laws.”33
With respect to the Tribes’ permitting requirement, the District
Court held that the Tribes properly exercised jurisdiction over FMC under
Montana’s first and second exceptions. 34 Although the District Court
found that both Montana exceptions applied, it only extended comity to
the tribal courts through the first exception,35 finding the Tribes failed to
establish a relationship between the annual fee and the existential threat
established under the second Montana exception.36 Notwithstanding the
Tribes’ improper exercise of jurisdiction under the second Montana exception as to $1.5 million annual fee, the District Court enforced the tribal
appellate court’s judgment under the first Montana exception, while also
holding that the tribal judicial process and the appellate court’s judgment

24.
25.
26.

Id. at *14.
Id.
Id. at *14–16 (referencing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *27–31.
Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *40.
Id. at *43.
Id. at *40–42.
Id. (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981)).

(1981)).
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did not violate FMC’s due process rights.37 Ultimately, the District Court
rejected FMC’s motion for declaratory judgment and injunction against
the tribal court’s judgment.38
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
FMC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”), arguing the Tribes lacked jurisdiction under both
Montana exceptions and that FMC was denied due process.39 The Tribes
filed a cross-appeal claiming “the [D]istrict [C]ourt erred in finding that
the judgment was not enforceable under the second Montana exception.”40
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “federal courts must recognize and enforce tribal court judgments under principles of comity,” which
in turn require the tribal court to have both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant and to ensure due process.41 Thus, if the
Tribes lacked regulatory jurisdiction, adjudicatory jurisdiction, or denied
FMC due process “because two judges of the Tribal Court of Appeals were
biased against it,” the Ninth Circuit reasoned the Tribal Appellate Court’s
decision would not be entitled to recognition under comity.42
A. Regulatory Jurisdiction
FMC is a non-Indian entity whose conduct is on non-Indian fee
land within the boundaries of the Reservation.43 For this reason, the Ninth
Circuit applied the framework established in Montana.44 Under Montana,
tribes retain civil regulatory jurisdiction where a non-Indian “enters into
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” or “the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation . . . threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe.”45
The Supreme Court has recognized that permit requirements and
permit fees constitute a form of regulation.46 Additionally, nonmembers
may expressly or implicitly consent to regulation under the first Montana
exception. 47 Based on these precedents, the Ninth Circuit concluded

37.
Id. at *42–43.
38.
Id.
39.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 930.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 930 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 295 F.3d 899,
903 (9th Cir. 2002)).
42.
Id. at 931.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
46.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 932.
47.
Plains Commerce. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.
316, 338 (2008).
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FMC’s agreement with the Tribes demonstrated both express and implicit
consent to the Tribes’ jurisdiction.48 While FMC argued the EPA coerced
its consent to tribal jurisdiction, the court found FMC’s decision constituted a “business decision” to avoid the costs and hardships of litigation.49
The Tribes merely took advantage of the bargaining leverage created by
the EPA and FMC’s negotiations.50 Further, because FMC had an extensive relationship with the Tribes dating back seventy years and a strong
understanding of the Tribes’ regulatory structure, the Ninth Circuit did not
find FMC’s objections to a non-Indian being subjected to strange and foreign laws compelling.51
Finally, in a previous dispute between FMC and the Tribes, the
Ninth Circuit determined the Tribes had regulatory jurisdiction to compel
FMC to comply with their Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance because
the two parties had negotiated and entered an agreement based upon the
Tribes’ ordinances.52 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held the agreement
constituted a consensual relationship under Montana.53 The court identified similarities between the facts of the 1990 case and the current case
and reasoned they should have the same conclusion.54 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Tribes satisfied the first Montana exception.55
As to the second Montana exception, FMC argued that the record
did not support tribal jurisdiction and Ninth Circuit precedent barred the
Tribes from asserting jurisdiction.56 However, upon examining the record,
the Ninth Circuit identified overwhelming evidence to the contrary. The
presence of elemental phosphorous in the ground and phosphine gas in the
air constituted an existential threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the
Tribes.57 FMC argued the EPA’s CERCLA plan, and FMC’s subsequent
implementation of that plan, addressed and eliminated the threat of harm
where elemental phosphorus had contaminated the ground.58 The Ninth
Circuit noted, however, many areas of the site had not been treated under
the CERCLA plan, and the EPA admitted the actions taken under the plan
did not eliminate the threat to the Tribes’ health and welfare.59 First, of
FMC’s eleven waste ponds⎯the source of the phosphine gas in the
air⎯FMC only capped nine.60 In 2006 and 2010, the EPA reported that
the “[h]igh concentrations of phosphine accumulating within the [FMC]
48.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 932.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 933–34.
52.
Id. at 934 (citing FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311
(9th Cir. 1990)).
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 939 (citing Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy
Comm'n, 736 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 2013)).
57.
Id. at 934–39.
58.
Id. at 936.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
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RCRA ponds . . . being released constitute[d] an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment within the
meaning of Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a),” and a former EPA official testified that FMC failed to adequately maintain the hazardous sites.61 A former official for the EPA testified that FMC did not
properly monitor the waste ponds and had not implemented a warning system.62
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that Evans did not apply to
this case.63 In Evans, the Tribes failed to establish that the construction of
a single-family home “threatened or had some direct effect on the political
integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the Tribes.”64 The
Ninth Circuit, however, differentiated Evans from the current case by noting “the threats from the FMC site . . . are not minimal annoyances. They
are the threat of catastrophic health reactions, including death.”65
Despite the remedial actions taken by FMC, the Ninth Circuit determined the toxic nature of the waste, the incomplete implementation of
these actions, and the fact that the continued threat of harm persisted even
where FMC had followed EPA instructions to completion, were all sufficient reasons to establish a threat satisfying the second Montana exception.66 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that FMC’s site constituted an existential threat to the health, safety, and welfare of the Tribes.67
Having established that both Montana exceptions had been satisfied, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a nexus existed between the second Montana exception and the Tribes’ request for damages.68 Reversing
the District Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit found “[a] more-than-sufficient nexus may be shown by comparing fees charged on the open market
for hazardous waste storage [against] the $1.5 million annual fee charged
by the Tribes . . . .”69 Based on the costs of commercial hazardous waste
disposers, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the $1.5 million annual fee was
“an extraordinary bargain” and established “a more-than-sufficient nexus
between the storage of FMC’s dangerous—potentially catastrophic—
waste and the $1.5 million annual use permit fee to warrant the assessment
of that fee under Montana’s second exception.”70

61.
Id. at 939 (internal citations omitted).
62.
Id.
63.
Id. at 940.
64.
Id. (quoting Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Comm’n,
736 F.3d 1298, 1303–06 (9th Cir. 2013)).
65.
Id. at 940 (internal citations omitted).
66.
Id. at 934–39.
67.
Id.
68.
Id. at 940.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 941.
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B. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
While Strate v. A1 Contractors established tribes’ adjudicatory jurisdiction must not exceed their regulatory jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
noted “the Supreme Court has never decided whether a Tribe’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is necessarily as extensive as its regulatory jurisdiction.”71
Citing two of its previous decisions, the Ninth Circuit stated adjudicatory
and regulatory jurisdiction must be congruent because “[a]ny other conclusion would impermissibly interfere with the tribes[’] inherent sovereignty, contradict long-standing principles the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, and conflict with Congress’s interest in promoting tribal
self-government.”72 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held the Tribes had both regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction.
C. Due Process
FMC additionally claimed the two judges who served on the threejudge tribal appellate court panel unfairly favored the Tribes.73 FMC cited
remarks the judges made at a conference sponsored by the University of
Idaho College of Law. 74 Upon reviewing the statements made by the
71.
Id.
72.
Id. (citing Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d
802, 816 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria of N. Paiute Indians, 922 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2019)).
73.
Id. at 942 (citing FMC Corp. I., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15–16.)
FMC highlighted statements by Judges Gabourie and Pearson. Judge Gabourie offered
his opinion relating to pollution by companies operating on reservations:
You know, there's one area, too, there are tribes that have had mining and other operations going on, on the reservation, you know,
and then the mining company or whatever, manufacturing company, disappears. They leave, you know. They've — they've either
dug everything they could, and the then ground is disturbed, sometimes polluted beyond repair. And you sit as a — as an appellate
court justice, and you're starting to read the cases that come down
from the tribal court. And you're saying to yourself, you know, We
know that the — there's pollution, that the food that they're eating
is polluted, the water's polluted, but nobody proved it. And while
John Jones said that it is polluted, you know, John Jones don't count.
But the tribal courts have got to realize that you need expert witnesses. You need chemists and whatever to get out of testifying. It
may cost a little, but so the appellate court is in a position of remanding that case back and say "do it."
Judge Pearson added:
If you're a law student and you're going to practice law, as well as
if you're a judge and you're going to be hearing cases, you know
where — companies come on the reservations and do business for
X number of years and they dirty up your groundwater and your
other things, and they go out of business. And they leave you just
sitting. And you need to know what you can do as you're sitting as
a judge with those cases coming toward you.
74.
Id.
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judges, the Ninth Circuit determined that neither judge had made “any
statements at the conference indicating bias against FMC.”75 To the contrary, a recording of the judges’ speeches revealed that they emphasized
the need for impartiality.76 While the judges criticized Supreme Court decisions, the Ninth Circuit concluded that their opinions did not indicate or
rise to a level of bias.77 Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit remarked that
the repaneling of the tribal appellate court and reconsideration of the previous panel’s decision obviated this argument.78
Finally, FMC argued that tribal courts inherently risk nonmember
due process.79 However, the Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and other circuit courts have consistently rejected such arguments. 80 Based on these
precedents and its own experience, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “contrary to the contention of FMC, tribal courts do not treat nonmembers unfairly.”81
Because the Tribes had both regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction—and because FMC was not denied due process—the Ninth Circuit
recognized and upheld the tribal appellate court’s decision under the principle of comity. 82 Further, the Ninth Circuit held the tribal appellate
court’s judgment enforceable under both Montana exceptions.83
V. CASE ANALYSIS
This case represents the quintessential scenario of a tribe seeking
to assert civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s conduct on non-Indian fee
land within the bounds of its reservation. The severity and extremity of the
circumstances, however, highlight federal courts’ reluctance to recognize
tribal civil jurisdiction. To fully understand the potential impacts of this
case, one must first understand the precedential history of the Montana
line of cases.
A. Precedential History
As noted by the Ninth Circuit in this case, biases within tribal
courts arising from the cultural divide between Indians and non-Indians
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 943.
80.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
81.
Id. at 944 (stating “[T]ribal courts often provide litigants with due
process that ‘exceed[s] the protections offered by state and federal courts” and empirical studies “demonstrate that tribal courts are even-handed in dispensing justice to
nonmembers.” (citing Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation,
862 F.3d 1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2017); Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider:
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1051
(2005)).
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 931, 941.
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remains a concern among many people and entities.84 In the nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court not only recognized tribal court decisions but
also found that that tribes’ cultural distinctions were “an additional reason
not to construe a vague treaty provision to repeal a statute clearly prohibiting such jurisdiction.”85 However, in the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court reduced the recognition of tribal jurisdiction within Indian Country.
In 1978, the Supreme Court found “that these considerations spoke
‘equally strongly against the . . . contention that Indian tribes . . . retain the
power to try non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure.’”86 Suquamish v. Oliphant87 established that this cultural divide was
“sufficient to remove all tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”88
Despite finding that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
the Supreme Court held that tribes retain criminal jurisdiction over their
members in United States v. Wheeler, and that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not
apply to tribal government actions concerning tribal members in Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez. 89 Thus, Wheeler and Santa Clara Pueblo
demonstrate a divergence between tribal authority over Indians and nonIndians.90
Oliphant addressed the extent of criminal, rather than civil, tribal
jurisdiction.91 In 1980, the Supreme Court first addressed tribal authority
to assert civil regulatory jurisdiction authority over non-Indians when it
found the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation had the regulatory jurisdiction to impose a tax on cigarettes purchased by non-Indians.92
Oliphant’s true impact on tribal civil jurisdiction was not revealed until
1981 in Montana v. United States, when the Court handed down one of its
greatest curtailments of tribal civil jurisdiction. 93 Drawing on Oliphant,
the Court held that “[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”94
Despite this curtailment, the Montana Court emphasized that,
“[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,

84.
Id. at 943.
85.
Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1057 (2005).
86.
Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211
(1978)).
87.
435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978).
88.
Berger, supra note 85, at 1058.
89.
Id. (referencing 435 U.S. 313 (1978) and 436 U.S. 49 (1978)).
90.
Id.
91.
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.
92.
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
93.
450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
94.
Id. at 565.
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even on non-Indian fee lands.”95 Thus, the Supreme Court held that tribes
lack civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land
unless: (1) the non-Indian “enter[ed into] consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements” or (2) “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within
its reservation . . . threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”96 Additionally, the Montana court stated that if Congress wished to extend
tribal jurisdiction to lands owned by non-Indians, it can do so “by incorporating . . . the definition of ‘Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”97
The cases immediately following Montana deviated from that decision in their support of tribal jurisdiction. 98 In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache, the Supreme Court held that tribes have the authority to tax nonIndians for oil and gas revenues from severed land under their “general
authority, as sovereign[s], to control economic activity within [their] jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by
requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic
activities within that jurisdiction.”99 However, the sentiment reflected in
Montana reemerged in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima.100 In Brendale, the Yakima attempted to assert civil regulatory
jurisdiction over two parcels of land, and the Court examined the landstatus to determine whether the Yakima had jurisdiction.101 The first parcel
was in an “open area” on the fringe of the reservation surrounded by a
significantly large non-Indian population, while the second parcel was in
a “closed area” in an undeveloped location at the heart of the reservation.102 By examining the characteristics of the parcels, a plurality of justices found that the Yakima had jurisdiction over the parcel within the
“closed area” of the reservation but not over the parcel within the “open
area” of the reservation.103 Thus, Brendale established a tribe can exert
civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian activity on fee land if the parcel is in a “closed area” of the reservation.104 Further, Brendale established
a tribe’s ability to zone land within its reservation was essential to prevent

95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted).
97.
Id. at 562. “Indian Country” means “all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the
reservation.” 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018).
98.
Berger, supra note 85, at 1060.
99.
455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
100. Berger, supra note 85, at 1060–61; see 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
101. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima, 492 U.S.
408, 417 (1989).
102. Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 617 F. Supp. 735, 752 (E.D.
Wash. 1985) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); Brendale, 492 U.S. 408,
417 (1989).
103. Berger, supra note 85, at 1061.
104. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 432.
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demonstrably serious harm and to prevent the imperilment of its political
integrity, the economic security, or health and welfare.105
Despite this brief stint of decisions favorable to tribes, nearly a
decade later the Supreme Court narrowed the Montana exceptions.106 In
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court ruled if the second Montana exception
only required non-Indian conduct to “jeopardize the safety of tribal members,” then “the exception would severely shrink the rule.”107 Thus, the
Court concluded that tribes must demonstrate that tribal civil jurisdiction
“is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”108
Similarly, in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court dismissed
the assertion under Jicarilla Apache that tribes had the authority to tax
economic activity on Indian lands.109 Using similar language as Strate, the
Atkinson Court asserted that the exception in Jicarilla Apache would
“swallow the rule.”110 Instead, the Atkinson Court ruled that for the first
Montana exception to apply, “the tax or regulation imposed by the Indian
tribe [must] have a nexus to the consensual relationship itself,” reasoning
consent in one circumstance did not constitute consent in all circumstances.111
In 2004, the Court once again diminished tribal civil regulatory
jurisdiction, specifically on tribal trust land. 112 In Nevada v. Hicks, the
Court held the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes lacked civil adjudicatory jurisdiction for a tribal member’s claim against a state officer for conduct on
tribal trust land.113 Read broadly, Hicks could indicate that tribes generally
lack civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian Country regardless
of land status.114 However, Justice Scalia stated this holding “is limited to
the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state
law.”115 Thus, the Court “[left] open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”116
The question of whether tribes may exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmember defendants remains undecided, despite being considered again by the Supreme Court in Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians, where the Court was evenly divided.117 In that
case, Dollar General entered a lease agreement with the Mississippi Band

105. Id.
106. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
107. Id. at 458.
108. Id. at 459.
109. 532 U.S. 645, 652–53 (2001).
110. Id. at 655.
111. Id. at 656.
112. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
113. Id. at 374.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 376.
116. Id. at 358, n.2.
117. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per curiam), aff’g Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss.
Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
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of Choctaw Indians to build a store on trust land.118 While the Fifth Circuit
declined to declare whether the first Montana exception required a consensual relationship to be commercial, the Fifth Circuit found that Dollar
General’s hiring of a minor as an intern under a tribal youth employment
program constituted “unquestionably a relationship "of a commercial nature.”119 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found a nexus between the youth
employment program and Dollar General’s tortious actions.120 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit held that tribes may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians on
tribal trust land.121 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
Fifth Circuit.122 However, this decision offers no insight or guidance in
determining to what extent tribes have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
in Indian Country because the Supreme Court could not reach a majority
decision.123 Rather, the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision merely affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment.124
Finally, in 2008, under Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., the Supreme Court collapsed the two Montana exceptions into one, noting that “Montana expressly limits its first exception to
the ‘activities of nonmembers,’ . . . allowing these to be regulated to the
extent necessary ‘to protect tribal self-government [and] to control internal
relations . . . .’”125 Further, Plains Commerce required under the second
Montana exception that the non-Indian conduct be “catastrophic” for tribal
self-government.126
Thus, over the course of three decades, the Supreme Court has
greatly reduced tribal jurisdiction. Tribal jurisdiction has eroded from recognizing jurisdiction to a general presumption against tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians on non-Indian fee land,127 unless the tribe can establish
that the activities of the non-Indians pose a “catastrophic” threat to tribal
self-governance. 128 The Supreme Court’s consistent whittling away at
tribal civil jurisdiction demonstrates a troubling trend for tribes in federal
Indian law. However, as Justice Scalia noted, “the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general” remains.129

118. Dolgencorp, Inc., 746 F.3d at 169.
119. Id. at 173.
120. Id. at 173–74.
121. Id. at 177.
122. 136 S. Ct. at 2159.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 554 U.S. 316, 332 (2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544, 564–65 (1981)).
126. Id. at 341.
127. Cf. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
128. Plains Commerce, 554 U.S. at 341 (2008).
129. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358, n.2 (2001).
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Montana Analysis
Given the recent trend regarding tribal civil jurisdiction, not only
did the Ninth Circuit reach the proper legal conclusion in FMC Corp. v.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, but the decision also represents a welcome respite for tribes. Since 1978, the Supreme Court has consistently moved the
goal posts, making the standard for establishing tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians increasingly stringent. 130 Given the precedential context of
the case, and the facts and circumstances from which the case arises, the
Ninth Circuit could have come to no other conclusion without seriously
calling into question tribal civil jurisdiction under the Montana line of
cases.
1. Consensual Relationship
As established in Montana, the Tribes overcame the presumption
that they do not have civil regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction over
FMC by establishing a consensual relationship.131 Based on the record and
the requirements set by Montana, Atkinson, and Plains Commerce, a finding other than a consensual relationship here would have been illogical.
Atkinson requires that consensual relationships have a nexus with
the conduct that the Tribe seeks to regulate.132 The Tribes and FMC negotiated an agreement where FMC acquiesced to submit to tribal jurisdiction
and pay an annual fee of $1.5 million in exchange for tribal permitting.133
The permitting directly addressed FMC’s disposal of the plant’s hazardous
materials.134 FMC entered this agreement specifically to satisfy its obligation to submit to tribal permitting under its agreement with the EPA, and
the Tribes sought to regulate FMC’s storage of hazardous waste.135 Because the consensual relationship existed for the express purpose of FMC
submitting to Tribal permitting, a nexus sufficient to satisfy Atkinson existed between the consensual relationship and FMC’s conduct.
Plains Commerce states that where a non-Indian “should have reasonably anticipated that [its] interactions might ‘trigger’ tribal authority,”
the first Montana exception is met.136 Plains Commerce further requires
the Tribes to show that FMC’s consensual relationship relates to conduct
that is “catastrophic” for tribal self-government.137 To complete the terms
of the consent decree with the EPA regarding hazardous waste disposal,
FMC consented to tribal civil jurisdiction. 138 The Ninth Circuit agreed
with the District Court that the agreement constituted a “sweetheart deal”
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See supra Section V(A).
450 U.S. at 565.
532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001).
FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7.
Id.
Id.
554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
Id. at 341.
Id.
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favoring FMC.139 FMC “desperately grasped” at the agreement to avoid
litigation with the EPA, reduce permitting fees from the Tribes, and continuing to store the hazardous waste on site.140
Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate that tribal authority would be
triggered where a non-Indian entity has negotiated an agreement to pay a
lower fee in exchange for submitting to a tribal permitting process. Such
terms leave no room for argument without altering the parameters of Montana. FMC attempted to side-step this issue by claiming the EPA coerced
it into submitting to tribal jurisdiction. 141 However, FMC had recourse
other than to negotiate a permitting agreement with the Tribes.142 While
the negotiations produced a potentially more favorable outcome than litigating with the EPA, FMC had the power to negotiate its relationship with
the Tribes.143 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded that a consensual relationship existed under Montana, Atkinson, and Plains Commerce.
2. Harm Catastrophic for Tribal Self-Governance
To satisfy the Montana test under Plains Commerce, FMC’s storage of elemental phosphorous in the ground and the waste pools must pose
a catastrophic threat to the Tribes’ self-governance.144 The EPA concluded
that the elemental phosphorus at the FMC site constitutes a “principal
threat waste,” meaning the waste is “highly toxic or highly mobile that
generally cannot be reliably contained or would present a significant risk
to human health or the environment should exposure occur.”145 Further,
the EPA’s CERCLA plan called for the capping of all contaminated areas.146 Not only did FMC fail to cap all contaminated areas, the EPA conceded that even if FMC had done so, the measure would still “present a
threat to [t]ribal health and welfare.”147
Additionally, phosphine gas “is ‘very flammable,’ ‘highly reactive,’ and ‘extremely toxic’ to humans.” 148 The gas is stored in waste
ponds, all but two of which have been capped.149 After two inspections,
the EPA found that FMC failed to properly maintain the ponds, which

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
LEXIS at *5.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 933.
Id.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 934.
Id. at 921–23; FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5–9.
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 921–23; FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist.
554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008).
FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 936.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 936–37.
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continued to leak gas, “constitut[ing] an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment.”150 Thus, the nature and state of the phosphorus and phosphine gas are such a threat that
catastrophe would follow any failed containment of either, while the remedial measures taken by FMC do not guarantee the safety of the Tribes,
and FMC’s implementation of said measures leaves much to be desired.151
Further, the nature of both the phosphorus and phosphine gas are such that
a failed containment would have effects beyond the plant site itself and
across the Reservation.152
Due to the catastrophic threat posed by the hazardous waste on
FMC’s site, the second Montana exception has clearly been satisfied. An
opposite finding would be nonsensical in light of the toxicity and volatility
of the substance and the uncertainty and poor execution surrounding
FMC’s remedial measures. Unlike Plains Commerce, Montana, and Strate,
the harm threatened in this case has the potential to cause serious injury or
death across the Reservation.153 Both the EPA and a witness for the Tribes
described the phosphine gas as a “close cousin to the phosgene gas used
in World War I” to kill soldiers and, therefore, “acutely and chronically
dangerous to people in the area or downstream . . . or downwind.”154 A
2010 EPA report highlights the severity of the threat with findings that the
gas emitted from one of the waste ponds presented an urgent public health
hazard.155 Additionally, the waste is exceptionally volatile and combustible when exposed to air.156 One witness explained the volatility of elemental phosphorus, testifying to seeing ducks spontaneously ignite as they
attempted to fly off after having landed in waste pond.157 The ducks and
EPA report represent just two of several specific threats to the Tribes;
however, they highlight the severity of the circumstances.158
By contrast, Plains Commerce concerned the sale of formerly Indian-owned fee land to a third party,159 Strate concerned a car crash,160 and
Montana concerned hunting and fishing regulations.161 The extreme circumstances in this case represent a threat of harm far greater than the harm
threatened in those cases. This case, therefore, is more akin to Brendale.
In Brendale, the Supreme Court held tribes retain inherent authority to
regulate non-Indian conduct that is “demonstrably serious and must im-

150.
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Id. at 936, 939.
Id. at 936, 938.
Id. at 937–38.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 935–36.
Id. at 936.
Id. at 935–38.
554 U.S. 316 (2008).
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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peril the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.”162 The Brendale Court determined that refusing to comply with tribal zoning ordinances imperiled the political integrity of the
tribe. Here, FMC sought to avoid compliance with tribal permitting for
storage of hazardous waste. If anything, FMC’s conduct presented a far
greater threat to political integrity due to the severity of potential harm.
As the exception is defined under Plains Commerce, Strate, and
Brendale, FMC’s conduct satisfies the second Montana exception. Any
other finding would obviate the exception. If a court found the storage of
hazardous material with the potential to severely injure or kill anyone
downwind or downstream of the facility in the event of a leak did not qualify as “catastrophic,” how much greater would a threat of harm have to be
to satisfy the second Montana exception? A ruling for FMC here would
call into question the ability of a tribe to assert civil jurisdiction over nonIndian conduct within a reservation—ever.
3. En Banc Petition
On November 29, 2019, FMC filed a petition for rehearing en
banc,163 which the Ninth Circuit denied.164 FMC argued that the Ninth Circuit misinterpreted Montana by disregarding its limitations and enlarging
both the first and second exceptions.165
First, FMC argued that the Tribes failed to demonstrate the annual
fee of $1.5 million was necessary to tribal government.166 However, as
noted in the Ninth Circuit opinion, the annual fee was necessary to conduct
the governmental services required to oversee the permitting process.167
Second, FMC argued the Ninth Circuit enlarged the two Montana
exceptions.168 In its petition, FMC alleged the first exception only applies
where tribes have entered into commercial relationships with non-Indian
entities and that the second exception cannot be satisfied by a “highly
speculative threat.”169 FMC argued that the establishment of a consensual
relationship was an exercise of tribal authority and therefore did not qualify under the first exception.170 Additionally, FMC claimed its relationship
fell outside the first Montana exception because it could not terminate the

162. 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989).
163. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc, Nov. 29, 2019, Nos. 17-35840,
17-35865.
164. Order Den. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc, Jan. 13, 2020, Nos.
17-35840, 17-35865.
165. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 11–16.
166. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 9–11.
167. FMC Corp. II, 942 F.3d at 941.
168. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 9, 10.
169. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 11, 12.
170. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 12.
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consensual relationship.171 However, FMC only entered into this relationship at the direction of the EPA.172 Additionally, FMC took advantage of
a “sweetheart deal” that it could have declined.173
Finally, FMC argued that the Ninth Circuit improperly substituted
speculative harm for actual harm under the second Montana exception,
stating that the Tribes were not under actual threat because of the preventative measures implemented under their EPA-approved plan. 174 Citing
Evans, FMC alleged that the court’s decision only allowed the Tribes to
assert jurisdiction where necessary to “avert catastrophe.”175 However, the
EPA testified that the protective measures under FMC’s plan were not
fully implemented, had flaws, and were not sufficient to eliminate the
threat. 176 Additionally, the type of harm here is much greater than the
“minimal annoyances” in Evans.177
Ultimately, FMC’s arguments in its petition for rehearing were
incorrect and unpersuasive. The court correctly applied Montana in this
case and properly determined the Tribes had civil jurisdiction over FMC.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit properly denied FMC’s petition.
VII. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions, this case may not be settled. On March 16, 2020, FMC filed a petition for writ of certiorari,178
reasserting that the Tribes lacked civil jurisdiction.179 Similar to its petition
for rehearing en banc, FMC argues the Ninth Circuit has misinterpreted
and incorrectly enlarged the Montana exceptions.180 In the petition, FMC
calls several Ninth Circuit decisions into question, including Water Wheel
and Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves.181
In the interim, the Ninth Circuit has agreed to stay the issuance of
its mandate. FMC, although blaming the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation,
notes the uncertainty surrounding Montana and the question of tribal civil
jurisdiction. 182 This assertion echoes Justice Scalia’s questioning of
whether Tribes may exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians is still an open

171. Appellant’s Pet. for Reh’g En Banc 12.
172. FMC Corp. I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *6.
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LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011); Window Rock Unified Sch. Dist. v. Reeves,
861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017)).
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question.183 This case may soon provide insight into that question and others left unanswered by both Hicks and Dollar General.
VIII. CONCLUSION
FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes provides a strong example of
the perils of tribal civil jurisdiction and the reluctance to extend recognition of tribal court authority. While its precedential history is fraught with
cases that have chipped away at what was once an inherent power of tribes
as sovereign nations, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is rightfully favorable to
tribal civil jurisdiction, even though the Supreme Court has consistently
restricted that authority over the last forty years. However, as is often the
case in federal Indian law, circuit court decisions, no matter how properly
reasoned or supported by precedent, are frequently overturned by the Supreme Court.
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